Abstract-In this paper, we present a behavior approach to detect Instant Messaging (IM) worm attacks. We extract characteristics of IM worm behaviors by analyzing the mechanism of IM worm propagation and define the corresponding characteristic functions the values of which can distinguish IM worm behaviors from normal user behaviors. Our approach starts to work through two stages. First stage, the training stage, we learn the means and deviations of characteristic functions from a profile. Second stage, the detection stage, simplified Mahalanobis distance is utilized to calculate the similarity of new data against the pre-computed profile. To make the detection mechanism insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method is applied to this measure and generates an alert when the distance of the new input exceeds the allowable distance the algorithm set. As a result, IM worms can be detected in a fully automatic and very efficient fashion.The evaluation results show that the detection mechanism has short detection latency and high detection accuracy.
INTRODUCTION
Instant Messaging (IM) services are very popular as an instant way of communication for tens of millions of Internet users over the Internet. Popular systems such as MSN Messenger (Windows Messenger in Windows XP) [1] , Yahoo! Messenger (YIM) [2] , AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) [3] , and ICQ [4] have changed the way we communicate with friends, acquaintances, and business colleagues. However, multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered and have yet to be discovered in Instant Messaging clients [5] . As a result, they pose great security challenges.
IM worms are different from the regular scanning and email worms [5] .Although researchers have exerted large efforts to understand and contain the propagation of scanning worms and email-worms [6] [7] [8] [9] ,these researches are not quite suitable for IM worms due to the different infection mechanism. M. Williamson et al apply Virus Throttling to Instant Messaging worms that spread over Instant Messaging service to slow the spread of worms. It works by preventing an infected machine infecting many others. But there are many limitations [10] . It may delay the valid messages and be too restrictive for IM users allowing only one new contact/day and so on. This paper presents a behavior approach to detect Instant Messaging worms. We first compute during a training stage the means and deviations of the characteristic functions the values of which are diverse from normal user behaviors to IM worm behaviors. Then, simplified Mahalanobis distance is utilized during the detection phase to calculate the similarity of new data against the pre-computed profile. To make our approach insensitive to site and access pattern, non-parametric CUSUM algorithm is applied to this measure and generates an alert when the distance of the new input exceeds the allowable distance the algorithm set. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the method on the data collected from a university IM server.
II. PROPOSED APPROACH

A. Characteristic Formulation
We find some characteristics which can distinguish IM worm behaviors from normal behaviors. After the load of worm code, IM worm may send a malicious URL in a text message to different users. So we can deduce that the proportion of URL sent will increase. We define function Count(x) as the number of different users one user communicates with using the same value x. For example, if one user sends www.google.com to four different friends in contact list, then Count(www.google.com) is equal to four. To describe this characteristic, we define characteristic function of URL() as (1) .
where U is the set of URL a user sends.
Another common infection characteristic is that victims send files with same size and same content. Actually, these files are IM worms. Of course human's behavior can also cause Instant Messaging communication with the same characteristic. Considering users do not do this all the time, we still use this characteristic as one of the worm's behavior characteristics. To describe this characteristic, we define characteristic function of file transfer requests as (2) .
where A is the set of file size a user sends.
We also consider the number of friends one user communicates with during a certain period. When users use IM software, they can choose which friend or several friends in the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Industrial Engineering (AIIE 2015) contact list to communicate. However, a worm tries to spread as fast as possible, so it may communicate with a large number of friends in the contact list, which deviates form the normal user behavior. Since an IP address can represent a friend in the contact list, we define characteristic function IPAder() to describe this characteristic as (3).
IPAddr ()=Number of distinct IP address (3)
B. Simplified Mahalanobis Distance
Mahalanobis distance is most commonly used as a multivariate outlier statistic. The metric essentially addresses whether the (unknown) new sample would be considered an outlier relative to the previously data profiles. Here we compute the distance between the characteristic distributions of the newly observed traffic against the profile learned in the training phrase. The higher the distance scores, the more likely this traffic is anomalous.
The Mahalanobis distance is defined as: The Mahalanobis distance has the advantage of utilizing means and variances for each variable, and the correlations and covariance between measures. Instead of simply computing the distance from means, it weights each variable by its standard deviation and covariance, so the computed value gives a statistical measure of how well the new example matches (or is consistent with ) the training samples.
In our problem, we use the assumption that the characteristics are statistically independent. Although the assumption does not typically hold, the Mahalanobis distance does provide a useful measure of the deviation of a current traffic profile from the baseline. Thus, the covariance matrix C becomes diagonal and the elements along the diagonal are just the variance of each characteristic. As a result, we derive the simplified Mahalanobis distance:
where the variance is replaced by the standard deviation. In our problem, n is set to three (since we have chosen three characteristics).
When contacting with friends by IM systems, users may not always use it due to the busy study or work. As a result, the values of characteristic functions may be below the corresponding mean, but that doesn't mean that it is anomalous. So such a deviation should not contribute to Mahalanobis distance. Consequently, we use (6) to compute simplified Mahalanobis distance. In order to make the detection approach insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method is applied to this measure. We will discuss it in section 2.3.
C. Non-parametric CUSUM Algorithm
Although we can set a threshold to detect IM worms, the non-parametric CUSUM method is applied to make our approach more general. This method enjoys all the virtues of sequential and non-parametric test, and the computation load is very light.
Let   is transformed into another random sequence {Z n }, i.e. Z n = X n −β, where β>α. Parameter β is a constant value for a given network condition, and it helps to produce a random sequence {Z n } with a negative mean so that all the negative values of {Z n } will not accumulate according to time. Therefore, we define {Z n } in our worm detection approach as follows: X so that the test statistic y n will be reset to zero frequently and will not accumulate with time. In our problem, β and N is set to three and twelve.
III. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Our experiment is based on simulation. Below, we describe the simulation environment and proceed to present the results of the experiments. We collected a dataset of 521 users of a University IM server (the IM service is only available within the campus) and split the dataset into two chronological parts for training and detecting worms respectively. In particular, the first 80% of the trace was used as training data and the rest 20% was used for detecting IM worms. This simulates the process of learning from the historical data and applying the proposed algorithm to current and future data. Moreover, we simulated IM worm infection by sending files or URLs in text messages which are two major vectors for IM worm propagation [5] to the online friends of the contact list every five minutes. Then, a mixture of both normal and IM worm traffic was used in the proposed algorithm. And the worm sets were inserted at random places in the test data.
A. Normal Traffic
Due to the busy work or hard study, users may not communicate with friends in the contact list all the time. So there is no message communicated through IM service sometimes, especially after midnight. The results are shown in Table 1 . 
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a behavior approach to detect Instant Messaging worms. We first compute during a training stage the means and deviations of the characteristic functions the values of which are diverse from normal user behaviors to IM worm behaviors. Then, simplified Mahalanobis distance is utilized during the detection phase to calculate the similarity of new data against the pre-computed profile. To make our approach insensitive to site and access pattern, non-parametric CUSUM algorithm is applied to this measure and generates an alert when the distance of the new input exceeds the allowable distance the algorithm set. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of the approach on the data collected from a university IM server.
